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COMMENT
FILING STATUS AND TODAYS FAMILIES
Erik Baies *
INTRODUCTION
A long-standing issue of tax policy is whether to tax people as
separate individuals or as social beings.1 That is, how should a
taxable unit be defined? Today, married couples may file either a
joint return or separate returns as married individuals. Howev-
er, filing separately often increases a couple's combined tax liabil-
ity.4 Single people must file exclusively as individuals, but their
rates are generally, though not always, higher than those of mar-
ried couples with the same amount of income.5 This tax difference
between a married person and an individual creates what are
known as marriage penalties and bonuses.6 These penalties and
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Melvin R. Hughes and the Honorable Bradley B.
Cavedo, Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. J.D., 2012, University of Richmond School
of Law; B.A., 2002, Virginia Military Institute.
This comment was the first place winner of the 2012 McNeill Writing Competition
sponsored by the McNeill Law Society of the University of Richmond School of Law. Tax
rates are referred to in the context of the year 2011 throughout the comment.
1. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1391 (1975).
2. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (2006).
3. See id. § 1(d) (2006).
4. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CAT. No. 15000U,
PUBLICATION 501: EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION 6
(2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs.pdflp50l.pdf. A married couple filing sepa-
rately often loses benefits or cannot take full advantage of benefits provided for in the tax
code. See id. More fundamentally, if the couple's incomes are vastly different, the higher
earner will have higher effective tax rates because that income will not be shifted to the
lower-earning spouse when filing separately. See id. at 7.
5. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(c) (2006).
6. Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 339
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bonuses often create a disincentive for both partners of a married
couple to be employed.' Historically, a single-earner couple was
the norm; however, society has changed since Congress adopted
the joint return in 1948.8 Shifting attitudes towards marriage and
cohabitation continue to move the family away from the single-
earner married couple norm.9
This comment argues Congress should place greater emphasis
on the goal of achieving marriage neutrality.'" A marriage-neutral
tax is one that does not take marriage into consideration in de-
termining a person's tax liability." The current tax code taxes
couples on the theory that married couples should be treated as a
taxable unit and should be taxed according to their combined in-
come." The rationale for treating similarly situated married cou-
ples differently from unmarried individuals fails for many practi-
cal reasons given today's social behaviors and attitudes.
Considering changes in societal norms, why should marriage be
a relevant factor in tax policy today? Why should a couple suffer a
penalty or derive a benefit merely because they are married?
With our progressive tax structure," there should be less focus on
marriage and more focus on an individual's ability or a family's
ability to pay those taxes.
Section I of this comment considers the early income tax code,
its focus on individual filing, and how early decisions of the Su-
(1994). Marriage penalties and bonuses are the tax savings or increased liabilities that
apply to a married couple by the fact of their marriage.
7. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1432-33; Zelenak, supra note 6, at 366.
8. See Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Re-
turn World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 682 & n.178 (2010); infra notes 78-80 and accompany-
ing text. In 1948, Congress adopted the optional joint return as we know it today, allowing
married couples to split their income between them regardless of who earned it. Revenue
Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 114-16 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 51(B)
(1946 & Supp. III 1950)).
9. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Hetero-
sexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 7-8 (2007); Kahng, supra note 8; infra notes
78-80 and accompanying text.
10. As discussed in more detail later, it is impossible to combine the three ideas of
marriage neutrality, progressivity, and treating similarly situated married couples equal-
ly. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
11. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1395.
12. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (d) (2006); see also Zelenak, supra note 6, at 339 & n.1.
13. Progressivity means that as a taxable unit's income increases, that income is
taxed at increasingly higher rates. Zelenak, supra note 6, at 339. An overarching idea of
the tax code is progressivity: the higher an individual's (or married couple's) income, the
greater their tax liability. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(d) (2006).
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preme Court of the United States led Congress to adopt optional
joint filing for married couples. Section II analyzes the joint re-
turn, tax norms, and arguments of proponents and opponents of
the joint return. Section III analyzes structural issues raised by a
return to an individual filing system, as well as why an individual
filing system is superior to a joint filing system given the changes
in American society. It also discusses a proposal to resolve an in-
equity that may be caused by a return to individual filing. The
comment concludes that the joint return should be replaced with
individual filing because individual filing better reflects today's
family compositions.
I. THE EARLY INCOME TAX
Early American income tax provisions favored individual fil-
ing.'4 Married couples have been able to file joint returns since
1918." While the Revenue Act of 1948 ("1948 Act") allowed in-
come splitting,'6 the Revenue Act of 1918 applied the same rate
schedule to both individual and joint filings; therefore, filing
jointly usually exposed a couple to a marriage penalty."8 Joint fil-
ings were only beneficial when one partner had negative income
because only then would a married couple obtain a marriage bo-
nus; the negative income would offset some of the income of the
other partner, thereby lowering their taxable income. 9
The Supreme Court of the United States weighed in on issues
raised by this individualistic approach. In Lucas v. Earl, the
Court held that a married couple who had contracted in 1901 to
split income equally between themselves could not do so in re-
20gards to wages for federal tax purposes. Income was taxed to the
earner of the income and it could not be assigned to another." Le-
14. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1400. The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified on Feb-
ruary 3, 1913, explicitly making income taxes constitutional. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DoC. NO. 103-6, at 33 &
n.8 (1996).
15. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074.
16. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114, repealed by Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 12, 684 Stat. 4, 11.
17. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 211, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062-64.
18. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1400.
19. See Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability
for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 335 (1990).
20. 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930).
21. Id. at 114-15.
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gal ownership of the income was the end-all be-all. After Lucas,
taxpayers could shift investment income by transferring the in-
come producing property to one spouse or the other, but those
22same taxpayers could not do the same with their wages.
In Poe v. Seaborn, the Supreme Court addressed the effect of
community property laws on federal income taxation. 3 The Court
stated, "[I]it is clear that income of community property is owned
by the community and that husband and wife have each a present
vested one-half interest therein." 4 The Court viewed community
property as vesting in the couple rather than the individual, with
one-half of all wage income from both spouses assigned to each
spouse as it was earned; therefore, the Court allowed couples in
community property states to split their income evenly. 5 At that
time, "the husband was given the management, control and pow-
er of sale of such property" in both community property and
common law property states; thus, there was not much difference
between how money was acquired and spent in either type of
state.2 6
These leading cases led to a great geographical tax liability
disparity between couples in common law states versus those in
community property states, which led to a movement among
common law property states to convert to community property
states.27 For example, in 1946, a single-earner couple with an in-
come of $5000 paid 4.8% less in taxes if they lived in a community
property state as opposed to a common law property state. 2" How-
ever, the most extreme difference was seen at $25,000, where the
difference was 28.9%.29 Some states attempted a lesser change,
22. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1401.
23. 282 U.S. 101, 103 (1930). This case also included three companion cases: Bender v.
Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.s. 122 (1930); and Goodell v. Koch,
282 U.S. 118 (1930).
24. Poe, 282 U.S. at 111.
25. See id. at 111, 118.
26. See id. at 111-12 (quoting Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 494 (1900)).
27. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1411.
28. Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Tax Bur-
dens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 n.56 (1980). Gann cites a Treasury Department staff study
which shows that at $5000 of income, a married couple in a common law state would pay
$798 in taxes and a couple in a community property state would pay $760. Revenue Revi-
sions, 1947-48 Hearings on Community Property and Family Partnerships Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong. 849 (1947) [hereinafter Hearings]. At $25,000 of
income, the tax liabilities would be $9082 and $6460, respectively. Id.
29. Gann, supra note 28, at 16 n.56.
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allowing couples to elect to be governed by the rules of tax-
favored community property despite the default rule of common
law property."
In Commissioner v. Harmon, the Supreme Court held that
those state statutes allowing couples to choose to be governed by
community property law over common law property rules had the
same effect as the inter-spousal wage-splitting contract rejected
for federal tax purposes in Lucas." Community property states
historically allowed couples to choose to be governed by common
law property rules; however, this was acceptable to the Supreme
Court because the default rule was community property rather
than common law property s' 2 Thus, a couple could "opt out"-but
not "opt in"-to community property."3 This again caused states to
shift their property laws from optional community property sys-
tems to mandatory systems. 4
In response to the great geographic disparity in income tax lia-
bility between couples in community versus common law property
states, in 1948, Congress authorized married couples to file an
optional joint return.5 Congress's adoption of the optional joint
return had several effects. Primarily, it allowed all married cou-
ples to split their income regardless of state law property rules.3 r
Thus, a married couple would have the same tax liability as two
single people making an equal amount." This also produced geo-
graphic equality in tax liabilities among married couples
throughout the states." The 1948 Act provided a massive tax re-
duction for couples in common law property states, which was fis-
cally possible with the end of World War 11. 3' Finally, the tax re-
30. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1411. Oklahoma, Oregon, Hawaii, Nebraska, Michigan,
and Pennsylvania all adopted the community property system until Congress passed the
Revenue Act of 1948, at which time these states quickly returned to their original common
law property regimes. Id. at 1411-14.
31. 323 U.S. 44, 45-46 (1944).
32. See id. at 55-56 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1411.
34. See id. at 1411-12.
35. Id. at 1412.
36. Id. at 1413 (quoting S. Rep. No. 80-1013, at 25 (1948), reprinted in 1948
U.S.C.C.S. 1163, 1187).
37. Zelenak, supra note 6, at 346.
38. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 80-1013, at 25).
39. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1410; see also Hearings, supra note 28, at 847 (esti-
mating that a change to an optional joint filing system would generate about $744 million
in tax savings for 4.9 million married couples).
2013]
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duction and the tax liability equalization of married couples
across the United States was politically favorable."
The original tax code favored individual filing." The Supreme
Court, however, overcomplicated the system and created large
geographic disparity between common law and community prop-
erty states.42 Congress attempted to resolve confusion and dispar-
ity through the 1948 Act; however, it did not legislatively reverse
Lucas nor Poe.43 Instead, it provided that any married couple, re-
gardless of their state of residence, could split their income.4 This
created the basis for the optional joint return schedule that exists
today.
II. THE TAx CODE AND FAMILIES
Today, a couple's marital status plays a predominant role in
calculating a family's tax liability. For example, a married cou-
ple with a combined taxable income of $100,000 in 2011 paid tax-
es of $17,250, i.e., an effective tax rate of 17.2%.46 A single indi-
vidual, or a single-earner non-married couple, with the same
income paid $21,617, an effective tax rate of 21.6%.47 Two single
individuals, each making $50,000, only had a combined tax liabil-
ity of $17,250, an effective tax rate of 17.2%, an identical rate as
that of a married couple with a combined income of $100,000.8
The justification for the current model is that married couples
pool their resources and therefore should be treated as a taxable
unit." The idea is that a married couple's combined income is
used for the benefit of the family.50 The tax norm of horizontal eq-
uity for married couples is served when married couples with the
same combined income pay the same amount of tax, i.e., that a
40. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1413.
41. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
42. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1408.
43. See S. Rep. No. 80-1013, at 23 (1948); Zelonak, supra note 6, at 347.
44. Zelenak, supra note 6, at 346; see H.R. Rep. No. 80-1274, at 4, 24 (1948).
45. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1399.
46. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297-98 tbl. 1. I.R.C. section 1(a) also in-
cludes surviving spouses. Id. This calculation excludes any deductions, exemptions, or
credits available to particular taxpayers. See id.
47. Id. tbl. 3.
48. See id. tbls. 1, 3.
49. See Gann, supra note 28, at 7.
50. See id.
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married couple with two earners each making $50,000 pays the
same tax as a married couple with a single earner making
$100,000. 5' Finally, the argument goes, the tax code should sup-
port the nuclear family because this family arrangement best
serves child-rearing."
Some tax scholars believe that an income tax should not con-
sider a taxpayer's marital status when calculating his tax burden.
These scholars believe that marital status does not affect a per-
son's ability to pay taxes and is therefore irrelevant.' Further-
more, some of these scholars equate a couple's choice to marry
with a personal consumption choice. 4 They argue that a person's
choice to marry is a voluntary choice that should not receive spe-
cial tax treatment.55 Finally, two single taxpayers also may live
together and pool their resources; thus, marital status is irrele-
vant to taxing similarly situated couples equally. A cohabitating
couple's income may be used toward expenses, savings, and
pleasure to the same extent as that of a married couple. Two sin-
gle individuals also may live together to reduce expenses, alt-
hough it is less clear that they also will combine their income for
the purpose of savings.
Four factors have a substantial bearing on a person or couple's
ability to pay taxes: (1) necessity of supporting two persons, (2)
economies of scale, (3) imputed income for housework, and (4)
employment expenses." Couples with both spouses working out-
side of the home have additional costs and do not benefit from the
additional time devoted to housework available to a single-earner
couple.57 On the other hand, a single person's cost of living is nat-
51. See id.
52. Robert L. Elbert, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the Marriage
Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1171, 1229 (1995).
53. Gann, supra note 28, at 6.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1443. A couple will benefit from economies of scale
because they often will pay rent on one home rather than two and save money on food pur-
chases, utilities, and the like as compared to two single people living in two different
households. See Gann, supra note 28, at 30. Imputed income for housework is the idea
that a single-earner couple will benefit from the non-earning partner's household labor
instead of labor outside of the home for income. See id. A two-earner couple, in order to get
the same benefit, would need to hire someone to do the housework and would have to pay
taxes on that money used to hire the houseworker. Id. Finally, examples of employment
expenses are the cost of uniforms or work clothing, commuting expenses, etc. See id.
57. See Gann, supra note 28, at 30.
20131
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urally lower than a couple's; therefore, a single person has a bet-
ter ability to pay taxes. A couple living together often benefits
from some degree of economies of scale, but if both partners are
employed, they have higher employment costs.58 For many of
these reasons, some tax scholars have suggested the following
equity criteria in determining tax burdens based on relative econ-
omies of scale and ability to pay:
(1) An unmarried person should pay a greater tax than a sin-
gle-earner married couple with equal income.
(2) A single-earner married couple should pay a greater tax
than a two-earner married couple with equal income.
(3) A two-earner married couple should pay more than two sin-
gle persons with the same total income.59
Furthermore, as pointed out by Boris Bittker,s° some scholars
suggest the equity objectives of our tax code and family status
should be:
(1) Progressivity of the income tax: taxpayers with higher in-
comes should have a larger tax burden than those with lesser in-
comes;
(2) Equal taxes paid by equal-income married couples; and
(3) No effect on the income tax by individuals' choice to marry,
i.e., it should be marriage-neutral."1
As Bittker explained, however, the first criterion is incompati-
ble with both the second and third.62 A progressive tax cannot al-
low for both marriage neutrality and for a married couple to cal-
culate their income together. So long as progressivity in an
income tax is an important criterion, the income tax either must
58. See id.
59. Id. (citing E.J. MOCKLER ET AL., STUDIES OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION,
No. 10: TAXATION OF THE FAMILY 129-31 (1964); Oliver Oldman & Ralph Temple, Com-
parative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 586, 603-04
(1960)).
60. Boris Bittker (1916-2005) was the Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School
and was a leading tax expert. See The Heyday of Legal Realism, 1928-1954, YALE L. SCH.,
http://www.law.yale.edu/cbl/3085.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
61. Gann, supra note 28, at 9 (citing Bittker, supra note 1, at 1395-96).
62. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1395 ("[G]iven a progressive rate schedule, a marriage-
neutral tax system cannot be reconciled with a regime of equal taxes for equal-income
married couples.').
[Vol. 47:729
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be marriage-neutral or allow for joint returns for married couples.
Bittker used the following tables to illustrate this point.
Table 1
HYPOTHETICAL INCOME AND TAXES BEFORE MARRIAGE
63
Taxable Income Tax
Alpha $10,000 $1000
Beta $10,000 $1000
Theta $4000 $400
Zeta $16,000 $2500
Table 2
EFFECT OF MARRIAGE ON TAXES
64
Marriage Will Have the Following Effect
On the Tax Burden Shown in Table 1:
If the Tax on Married Couples with Alpha-Beta Theta-
$20,000 of Taxable Income is: Zeta
Less than $2000 Decrease Decrease
$2000 No Change Decrease
More than $2000 but less than Increase No
$2900 Change
More than $2900 Increase Increase
Bittker demonstrates that it is impossible for an income tax to
be progressive, treat similarly situated married couples equally,
and be marriage-neutral.65 For example, if the tax was marriage-
neutral, each couple makes $20,000, but Theta-Zeta would pay
$2900 in taxes while Alpha-Beta would pay only $2000.66 If the
second criterion, horizontal equity between married couples, was
honored, both married couples would pay the same amount in
taxes.67
63. Id. at 1396 thl. 1. Note that Zeta's income is highest and is taxed at a higher rate
than 10%, reflecting progressivity. See id.
64. Id. at 1397 tbl. 2.
65. Id. at 1396.
66. Id. at 1395-96.
67. Id. at 1396.
20131
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The ability-to-pay factor, that "[an unmarried person should
pay a greater tax than a one-worker married couple with equal
income,"68 is a weak argument in support of the current system.
Its primary rationale is economies of scale;69 however, all couples
benefit from economies of scale. The married single earner filing
jointly greatly benefits from the imputed income of their non-
earning partner and, therefore, should pay at least the same tax
as an unmarried person. A one-person household must bear the
full cost of living alone and also does not gain any imputed in-
come from a partner providing household services; on the other
hand, the one person only needs to take care of himself or herself.
Two single persons, cohabitating or simply living together as
roommates, can benefit from economies of scale (and possibly im-
puted income of household services), and the mere fact of mar-
riage should not provide either a benefit or a penalty. A single-
earner couple certainly should not obtain a tax benefit based on
their marital status. Equally important, a two-earner married
couple with near equal wages should not be penalized, as they of-
ten have the same burdens as a two-earner cohabitating couple.
The next section delves into why marriage neutrality and pro-
gressivity should be prioritized over treating similarly situated
married couples similarly.
III. THE CASE FOR THE RETURN TO INDIVIDUAL FILING
The primary rationale for joint tax returns is the assumption
that a married couple is an economic unit.7 The idea is that the
income of one spouse or both will benefit the family unit as a
whole.7 However, this "benefit principle" is not exclusive to the
marital unit and extends to any relationship where costs are
shared, thereby freeing income for other activities.72 An individual
filing system does not consider economic units, nor should it nor-
mally. If people choose to live together in order to save money,
this choice should not be affected by the tax code. American fami-
lies are much more diverse than they were in 1948 and American
68. Gann, supra note 28, at 8 (citing Oldman & Temple, supra note 59, at 603-04).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 6.
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family composition continues to move away from the married
couple. 4
A. Family Composition Today
The establishment of the joint return reflected American
household compositions in 1948 and made much more sense when
the married couple was the dominant family living arrange-
ment. 5 Today's family living arrangements are much more di-
verse. 6 A return to individual filing better reflects the composi-
tion of today's diverse family living arrangements by ignoring
marriage in determining tax liabilities. Similarly situated couples
face similar economic issues, regardless of their marital status. A
couple should neither derive a tax benefit nor suffer a tax penalty
because the couple is married.
A significant portion of households have more than one earner
or are one-person households; thus, the married couple is not as
predominant as it once was among American families. For exam-
ple, the number of one-person households more than doubled be-
tween 1960 (13%) and 2010 (27%). 7' Between 2009 and 2010, for
instance, the number of unmarried cohabitating opposite-sex
couples increased by 13%, from 6.7 million to 7.5 million.78 In
1948 (when the joint return was initially adopted), married cou-
ples composed more than 75% of all households.7 '9 Although fifty-
eight million couples were married and living together at the time
of the U.S. Census survey in November 2011, they composed only
about 49% of all households. 0 Statistics show a trend away from
74. See Kahng, supra note 8, at 682 n.178.
75. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money and the IRS: Family, Income Sharing,
and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 101-02 (1993).
76. See Kahng, supra note 8, at 682 n.178.
77. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Reports Men and Women
Wait Longer to Marry (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroomire
leases/archives/familieshouseholds/cblO-174.html.
78. Rose M. Kreider, Increase in Opposite-Sex Cohabiting Couples from 2009 to 2010
in the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey
(CPS) 1-2 (Hous. & Household Econ. Statistics Div. Working Paper, 2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/Inc-Opp-sex-2009-to.2O l0.pdf.
79. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE HH-1: HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE: 1940 TO PRESENT
(2011) [hereinafter TABLE HH-1], available at http:/www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
hh-fanmhhl.xls.
80. See id.
2013]
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the nuclear family and marriage as the norm, although it still
remains the predominant household arrangement.
Attitudes about unmarried cohabitation and working mothers
show that a majority of Americans believe that neither marriage
nor a stay-at-home spouse is necessary to raise a family. Accord-
ing to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, about 75%
of men and women today agree or strongly agree that "[i]t is okay
for an unmarried female to have a child," and about 70% of men
and women disagreed or strongly disagreed that "[a] young couple
should not live together unless they are married."8' Significantly,
when men and women were asked whether "[a] working mother
can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her
children as a mother who does not work," about 80% agreed or
strongly agreed.82 When presented with the statement, "It is more
important for a man to spend a lot of time with his family than to
be a success at his career," about 70% of the men and women
agreed or strongly agreed.' These attitudes show that there likely
will continue to be increases in cohabitating partners, single par-
ent families, and couples of all kinds where both partners are
employed.
B. Employment and Income
Ability to pay is a key factor in an equitable tax system. 4 A
2009 study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that people in
the lowest and second-lowest quintile of income earn less than
they spend."
81. See Key Statistics from the National Survey of Family Growth, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 27, 2012), http://wwwcdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/abc_
list~a.htm.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Prerna Rao, Note, What Would Humphrey Bogart Do?: An Overview of Federal
Taxes as They Apply to the International Community of U.S. Nationals, 25 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 298, 304-05 (2012).
85. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. REPORT 1029, CONSUMER
EXPENDITURES IN 2009, at 10 tbl. I [hereinafter CONSUMER EXPENDITURES], available at
http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxannO9.pdf.
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Table 3
Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Average Annual Expenditures and
Characteristics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2009 s6
Item Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest
20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Income before taxes $9846 $27,227 $46,012 $73,417 $157,631
Average number in
consumer unit:
Persons 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.1
Children under 18 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
Persons 65 and older 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2
Earners 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.0
Average Annual $21,611 $31,382 $41,150 $56,879 $94,244
Expenditures III___
Some expenditures may be discretionary; however, a vast ma-
jority of the expenditures are necessities at the lowest quintiles.
For example, average annual expenditures in the lowest two
quintiles totaled $21,611 for the lowest quintile, and $31,382 for
the second-lowest quintile. 7 Of these expenses, $18,320 was spent
on food, housing, transportation, healthcare, personal care, edu-
cation, and personal insurance/retirement (including Social Secu-
rity) at the lowest quintile, and $26,427 was spent on these ne-
cessities at the second-lowest quintile, a difference of $3291 and
$4955, respectively, from the total expenditures."8
People in the second-lowest quintile on average had more peo-
ple in the household than people in the lowest quintile, which ac-
counts for at least some of the increased expenditures between
the two lowest quintiles." People do not have a significant
amount of excess income unless they are in the fourth or highest
quintile ($16,538 and $63,387, respectively).9 Taxing those people
in the lowest quintiles would not be effective if such a tax made
them a public ward, nor in any sense would it be equitable. Our
86. Id. This table was shortened to include only the relevant statistics needed for the
purposes of this comment.
87. Id.
88. Id. Other expenses listed in the report include entertainment, reading, tobac-
co/smoking supplies, miscellaneous, and cash contributions. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
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current system recognizes this through the personal exemption
and the standard deduction."'
Significantly, the number of earners rises as income rises. For
example, in the third quintile an average of 2.5 people are in the
household, 0.6 of which are children under eighteen, 0.3 are older
than sixty-four, and 1.3 work.92 Since children under eighteen are
not as likely to be in the labor force as an adult and people older
than sixty-four are more likely to be retired, the 1.3 workers in a
2.5-member household grows more significant in showing how
many earners are present in households at this quintile. Thus, it
is likely that, for many couples in the third quintile, both individ-
uals work. Recent statistics from the Census Bureau also bolster
this theory:
91. The standard deduction and personal exemption reduce tax liabilities by amounts
set by Congress in the tax code. I.R.C. §§ 63, 151 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). These deductions
significantly reduce or eliminate tax liability for low-income persons or couples. For in-
stance, a person with income less than or equal to the standard deduction and personal
exemption will not have taxable income.
92. CONSUMER EXPENDITURES, supra note 85.
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Table 4
Married Couple Family Groups, by Family Income, and Labor Force
Status of Both Spouses: 2010 (Numbers in thousands)"3
Married Couple All Married Both Employed/ Neither in
Family Households Couples Both in Labor Labor Force
Force
Without Own Children
under 18 Years
Total 33,835 13,594 9301
Family Income 726 49 447
Under $10,000
$10,000 to $14,999 675 28 412
$15,000 to $19,999 1012 64 689
$20,000 to $24,999 1473 107 965
$25,000 to $29,999 1662 140 1050
$30,000 to $39,999 3301 510 1618
$40,000 to $49,999 2943 681 1123
$50,000 to $74,999 6977 2751 1590
$75,000 to $99,999 5096 2738 678
$100,000 and over 9969 6525 729
With Own Children
under 18 Years
Total 24,575 14,300 388
Family Income 515 56 101
Under $10,000
$10,000 to $14,999 421 64 39
$15,000 to $19,999 543 103 50
$20,000 to $24,999 733 152 40
$25,000 to $29,999 837 220 29
$30,000 to $39,999 1748 579 54
$40,000 to $49,999 2016 932 16
$50,000 to $74,999 5037 2937 28
$75,000 to $99,999 4086 2920 10
$100,000 and over 8640 6338 21
The Census Bureau data shows that nearly half of all married
couples with children with income between $40,000 and $49,999
are two-earner married couples.94 Similarly, if the number of mar-
93. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE FG2: MARRIED COUPLE FAMILY GROUPS BY FAMILY
INCOME, AND LABOR FORCE STATUS OF BOTH SPOUSES: 2010 (2010), available at http:/]
www.census.gov/populationisocdemo/hh-famcps2Ol/census/tabFG2-all.ls (edited to pre-
sent only the numbers significant to this comment).
94. See id.
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ried couples without children where neither spouse is in the labor
force is taken from the total, nearly 40% of the couples in this
same income range are also two-earner couples.95 In the face of
the current unemployment rate these numbers become even more
significant. 6 In the lower brackets it is likely that both individu-
als in a couple cannot work when they have children because of
the high cost of child care as compared to the lesser-earner's af-
ter-tax income.97
Many couples today have two earners, but a looming issue soon
will require even more two-earner couples: the aging population.
In order to help sustain the economy, Social Security, and other
retirement plans, it will be necessary for more people to be em-
ployed and to assume the jobs of those who retire.98 The labor
force has contracted more than 1% since 2008, and is forecasted
to expand only slowly over the next forty years.99 In the 1950s and
1960s, 52% and 57%, respectively, of American family households
had their own children under age eighteen. 0 By 2008, this per-
centage was 46%. °'0 In 2010, there were 308 million people in the
United States. 112 Seventy-four million of those people were over
the age of fifty-five0 3 and another forty-five million were between
the ages of forty-five and fifty-four."4 According to the Census Bu-
95. Id.
96. See generally Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., The Employment Situa-
tion-September 2011 (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/arch
ives/empsit_10072011.pdf. As of September 2011, the national average unemployment
rate was 9.1%; however, for blacks it was 16%. Id.
97. See LINDA GIANNARELLI & JAMES BARSIMANTOV, CHILD CARE EXPENSES OF
AMERICA'S FAMILIES (2000), available at http:/www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310028_occa
40.pdf.
98. Steve Matthews & Joshua Zumbrun, Shrinking Labor Force May Curb U.S. Ex-
pansion for Two Decades, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/
2011-08-30/aging-baby-boomers-shrinking-labor-force-may-curb-u-s-growth-for-20-years.h
tml (detailing government forecasts of future insufficient funds for Medicare and Social
Security).
99. See id.
100. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, As Baby Boomers Age, Fewer Families
Have Children Under 18 at Home (Feb. 25, 2009), [hereinafter As Baby Boomers Age],
available at http:/lwww.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/familieshouseholds/cb09-
29.html.
101. Id.
102. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 21
tbl. 16 (2011) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2010], available at http://www.census.
govlcompendialstatab2012/tables/12sO16.pdf.
103. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX: 2010 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.census.gov/populationiage/data/files/2010/tablel.xls.
104. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2010, supra note 102.
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reau, the aging population has been caused not only by the aging
baby boomers, but also because of increases in longevity and
childlessness."5 More people working will make more people sub-
ject to the Social Security wage tax, which, presumably, will gen-
erate more revenue for sustaining Social Security.
C. Imputed Income for Household Services
A single-earner married couple should not derive a tax benefit
from their choice of one partner staying home. Again, such cou-
ples derive a substantial, non-taxable benefit from the housework
the non-working partner is able to perform, and the imputed in-
come value of this labor is significant. Taxing such imputed in-
come is not an answer because such a tax is administratively dif-
ficult (if not impossible) to effectuate: What if one spouse worked
part-time? If both did? If one was unemployed? The Census Bu-
reau's definition of "stay-at-home parent" is one who is out of the
labor force during a fifty-two-week period to care for home and
family, has a spouse that is in the labor force for the same fifty-
two weeks, and has a child under age fifteen."' Would the stay-at-
home spouse merely need to work a single day in order to avoid
imputed income tax liability? If not, how many days or hours of
work would qualify?
Taxing imputed income across all income levels would create
vast inequities for those with children in the lowest quintiles of
income who cannot afford for both partners to work because of
significant child care costs." ' For example, if imputed income for
household services were calculated by the federal minimum wage
($7.25 per hour)' 8 at full time (forty hours per week),"0 9 the annu-
al value of household services would be $15,080. A married couple
with income of $20,000, if filing jointly in 2011-12, would have to
pay taxes of $4412 on $35,080 income (adding imputed income of
105. See id. In 1976, 10% of women aged forty to forty-four were childless. Id. This
number was 20% in 2006. Id.
106. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-561, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
2007, at 12 (2009), available at http://www.cerisus.gov/prodl 2009pubs/p20-561.pdf.
107. See GIANNARELLI & BARSIMANTOV, supra note 97, at 1, 3-5.
108. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
109. Everyone knows that a "parent's work is never done," and that forty hours a week
is a poor estimate; the number of hours a stay-at-home spouse works is likely much larger
than forty hours a week and includes holidays.
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$15,080 to $20,000 of actual income)."' The tax liability for
$20,000 of income would be $2150;..' therefore, this couple would
pay an additional tax of $2262 if imputed income were taxed.
Most low-income couples could not afford to pay this additional
tax in order for one partner solely to perform household ser-
vices."' Taxation of imputed income would cause a great intrusion
into the individual family. It would be inequitable at low-income
levels. In sum, these and other administrative difficulties, as not-
ed above, make taxing imputed income impractical, if not impos-
sible.
Taxing imputed income is not the answer, but providing tax
benefits to those married couples able to take advantage of a
spouse's housework is not the answer either. A two-earner couple,
in order to get the same benefit of household services, would need
to hire a housekeeper, babysitter, an errand boy, etc. Their in-
come used to pay these wages is taxed; thus, they do not benefit
from the same untaxed imputed income as a single-earner couple.
Furthermore, a two-earner couple must pay increased employ-
ment costs."3 A two-earner couple with a combined income equal
to that of a single-earner married couple should not bear the
same tax burden. In fact, they should have a lesser burden. For
example, imagine Alpha-Beta is a two-earner couple. Alpha and
Beta each earn $50,000 per year for a combined income of
$100,000. Theta-Zeta are a single-earner couple, and Theta
makes $100,000. The cost of a houseworker is $20,000 per year
and employment commuting expenses are $5000 a year for each.
Alpha-Beta will have $25,000 less disposable income before tax
than Theta-Zeta, because Alpha-Beta must pay the household
worker and pay double the employment expenses."'
Under an individual filing system, a married couple would not
receive a tax benefit along with the benefit of a stay-at-home
spouse. Income is attributed to the spouse who earned it with in-
110. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297-98 tbl. 1 (($35,080 - $17,000) x 0.15 +
$1700 = $4412). This calculation is based on the rates of a married couple filing jointly and
does not include personal exemptions or a standard deduction.
111. See id. (($20,000- $17,000) x 0.15 + $1700= $2150).
112. Cf. supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (detailing expenses of lower-income
couples as already exceeding income).
113. See Gann, supra note 28, at 30.
114. The math works out as so: for Alpha-Beta: $50,000 + $50,000 - $20,000 - $5000 -
$5000 - $70,000 before tax income, versus Theta-Zeta: $100,000 - $5,000 = $95,000 of be-
fore tax income, a difference of $25,000.
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dividual filing. However, income-shifting between spouses cur-
rently is available under the joint filing system. 115 Since imputed
income is a non-taxable benefit in and of itself, couples who
choose to arrange their lifestyles this way should not also receive
a tax benefit.
Income from property, however, still may be shifted to the less-
er-earning partner by shifting the ownership of the property." 6 A
new tax code provision would be necessary in order to address
this issue. Income attribution has been a long-standing issue with
our income tax code." 7 Although allowing all married couples to
file joint returns "solved" this issue as between married couples,
such shifting is possible between anyone by shifting the owner-
ship of the property."'
D. Income Attribution
Current Supreme Court precedent presents a large problem for
resolving issues of income attribution. Under an individual filing
system, this precedent creates large geographic disparities in tax
burdens across the United States."9 A return to the individual fil-
ing system may necessitate congressional action to legislatively
overrule Lucas v. Earl or Poe v. Seaborn. Congress also may make
these cases irrelevant for the purposes of attributing income be-
tween couples. The 1948 Act overruled neither but made them ir-
relevant by allowing spouses to file together regardless of their
state of residence. 2' The primary purposes of this act were to cre-
ate geographic equality and a politically favorable tax reduc-
tion.12'
The Federal Income Tax Code should neither be subject to var-
ied state property law nor embroiled in state property law. For
example, the early income tax and the resulting Supreme Court
decisions in Lucas and Poe caused several states to change their
115. See supra notes 35-37.
116. See James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children,
and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409, 1422 (2010).
117. See supra Section 1.
118. Shifting is subject to gift taxes if the value of the property is over the limits cur-
rently allowed. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(7) (2006).
119. See supra Section I.
120. See Zelenak, supra note 6, at 346.
121. See S. Rep. No. 80-1013, at 25 (1948).
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state property laws.122 This method of taxation was inefficient in
that it caused states and individuals to change their normal ac-
tivities in order to receive a beneficial tax result.123 Plus, individ-
uals should neither benefit from nor be burdened by the tax sys-
tem merely because of what state they live in; i.e., a federal tax
should maintain geographic equality.
A rather simple124 solution to the issue of income attribution be-
tween spouses under various state laws would be to (1) tax the
earner on wages and (2) tax income from property at the rate of
the highest-earning partner while imposing that tax on the owner
of the property. 125 This solution would avoid the issue of state
property laws, maintain geographic equality, and reduce the inci-
dences of spouses transferring income-producing property be-
tween them in order to avoid or minimize tax liability. A constitu-
tional issue, however, is raised by taxing one person based on the
income of another.
In Hoeper v. Tax Commission, the Supreme Court ruled a state
income tax statute unconstitutional that taxed a husband on his
own income at rates determined in consideration with the wife's
income. 2 6 However, Lawrence Zelenak2 7 and Pamela Gann... be-
122. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1411-12; Zelenak, supra note 6, at 345.
123. See Zelenak, supra note 6, at 345-46. Efficiency is another tax policy norm. See
Stanley S. Surrey & Gerard M. Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy,
9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 915, 915 (1968). An efficient tax should not typically cause people
to rearrange their affairs in order to obtain tax favorable results. Id. The tax code, howev-
er, is sometimes used for other policy purposes. For example, when Congress uses the tax
code in order to provide tax benefits for certain actions (like the deduction for a primary
home mortgage interest), such use of the tax code is called a tax expenditure. Gordon T.
Butler, The Line Item Veto and the Tax Legislative Process: A Futile Effort at Deficit Re-
duction, But a Step Toward Tax Integrity, 49 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 7 (1997). Tax expenditures
may violate the efficiency norm because the expenditure may cause people to rearrange
their affairs to take advantage of that expenditure.
124. A simple tax code encourages higher rates of compliance, in part by making com-
pliance easier for the average individual. See Douglas Shulman, Comm'r, Internal Reve-
nue Serv., Remarks at Harvard Kennedy School (Nov. 14, 2011), available at http://www.
irs.gov/uac/Prepared-Remarks-of-IRS-Commissioner-Douglas-H.-Shulman-before-Harvard
-Kennedy- School,-Cambridge,-Massachusetts ('"Most taxpayers want simplicity. They
want to pay what they owe... understand what tax benefits they are entitled to... and
not get tripped up by the system."). Simplicity is only one benchmark of tax policy, and an
overemphasis on it can result in a less equitable code. See, e.g., Surrey & Brannon, supra
note 123, at 915 ('Since 'simplification' is only one of several competing goals of tax policy,
an assessment of its place should start with an attempt to state those goals in comparative
terms. The main rival to oversimplification is, of course, equity.").
125. Zelenak, supra note 6, at 389.
126. 284 U.S. 206, 212-13, 215 (1931).
127. Lawrence Zelenak is the Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law at Duke University
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lieve that Hoeper no longer has any precedential value.129 Zelenak
emphasized the cases of Butler v. United States and Carlton v.
United States, which both distinguished Hoeper."'3 Where Hoeper
involved taxing one person on another's income, the tax schemes
in Butler and Carlton used another's income merely to determine
another taxpayer's tax rate.3  Gann emphasized Fernandez v.
Wiener, in which the Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue
of income attribution and taxation as Hoeper, but decided that
the statute involved in Fernandez was constitutional. 133 Gann
points out that Hoeper is not even mentioned, which had the ef-
fect of leaving "very little life in Hoeper.'34
E. Revenue Neutral?
Another issue raised by changing the current system is wheth-
er or not revenue to the Treasury would be reduced. The answer
is: maybe. Tax savings would shift from the single-earner family
to the two-earner family, especially where the partners make
nearly equal amounts.35 These savings, which may net a loss in
revenue to the Treasury, could be offset in part by the revenue in-
creases attendant with having more net workers in the econo-
my-sales tax revenue for states, gasoline revenue from addition-
and primarily teaches tax and tax policy. Lawrence A. Zelenak, DUKE UNIv. SCH. OF L.,
http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/zelenak (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
128. Pamela Gann is the former dean of Duke University School of Law and is the cur-
rent president of Claremont McKenna College in California. Pamela B. Gann: President of
Claremont McKenna College, CLAREMONT McKENNA COLL., http://www.cmc.edu/president
/gann-bio.php (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
129. Gann, supra note 28, at 57-58; Zelenak, supra note 6, at 390.
130. Zelenak, supra note 6, at 389-90 (citing Butler v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 574,
576 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Carlton v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 746, 747-48 (N.D. Miss,
1991)).
131. Id. (citing Butler, 798 F. Supp. at 576; Carlton, 789 F. Supp. at 748). Both of these
cases were in the context of the kiddie tax, the taxation of certain unearned income of
children at their parents' tax rates. Butler, 798 F. Supp. at 575 (referring to I.R.C. § l(g)
Supp. III 1992)); Carlton, 789 F. Supp. at 747 (referring to I.R.C. § 1(g) (Supp. III 1992)).
132. Gann, supra note 28, at 57-58.
133. 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (finding constitutional an estate tax which taxed a sur-
viving wife in a community property state on the entirety of her husband's estate, except
to the extent of her own earned income).
134. Gann, supra note 28, at 58. Gann goes on to point out that Justice Douglas, in his
concurrence in Fernandez, agrees with the dissenters in Hoeper. Id. (citing Fernandez, 326
U.S. at 365 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
135. See supra Section II.
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al commuting, Social Security wage tax revenue, and additional
136instances of federal income tax revenue.
F. Modified Individual Filing: A New Schedule
An issue not resolved by a reversion to individual filing would
be the inequitable result of increasing the tax burdens of those
couples with children who currently cannot afford to have both
partners working. Marriage neutrality is great, but an individual-
ized filing system would increase the burden on those married
families where the after-tax income of one parent is equal to or
less than the cost of child care. The joint return allows these sin-
gle-earner, low-income families to split their income and reduce
their tax liabilities, thereby freeing up funds for necessaries. '
Marriage, however, does not create or solve this problem. Cohabi-
tating couples with children in the same circumstances also
would face this issue, as would employed grandparents or other
relatives providing for dependents who live in their household.
Pure individual filing is not the answer.
1. Current Code Sections
Several code sections attempt to alleviate a low-income family's
economic situation. Some of these sections likely affect a person's
decision to work. The Child and Dependent Care Credit attempts
to encourage employment,138 but the Earned Income Tax Credit
("EITC") may in some circumstances negatively affect a person's
desire to work.9 Former Internal Revenue Code section 221 also
encouraged married couples to both find employment. 40
The Child and Dependent Care Credit attempts to resolve this
issue, but it is difficult to obtain and is not applicable to many
families. First, it cannot be claimed if a taxpayer is married and
136. Cf. 2 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 3.2.1 (3d ed. Cur. Supp. No. 2 2012) (discussing the general uncer-
tainty of how changes to the tax code will change taxpayer behavior).
137. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
138. See I.R.C. § 21 (2006) (allowing credit against certain taxes for the taxable year in
an amount equal to the applicable percentage of employment-related expenses).
139. See id. § 32 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (allowing a credit against certain taxes for the
taxable year in an amount equal to the credit percentage of the amount of a taxpayer's in-
come for the taxable year as does not exceed the earned income amounts).
140. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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filing separately.' However, under an individual filing system,
this would be a moot issue. The credit applies to a "qualifying
child"'42 when a person pays for child care expenses in order to ei-
ther work or look for work. " The care provider must be identified
and the maximum benefit is limited to 35% of qualifying child
care expenses."' The qualifying expenses cannot exceed $3000 for
one child or $6000 for two or more children."5 The Child and De-
pendent Care Credit should be maintained; however, it seems
that it does not do enough to allow both individuals in lower-
income couples to work. There should be additional incentives for
two-earner families with dependents. Finally, this credit is non-
refundable so lower-income families cannot take full advantage of
this provision if their tax liabilities are already zero.'46
Child care is especially burdensome on three family groups:
single-parent families, families with younger children, and fami-
lies with low income.'47 Three out of five working American fami-
lies pay for child care. 48 On average, American families in 1997
paid 10% of their income towards child care; however, single par-
ents and low-income families on average paid 16% of their income
towards child care.4 9 A 2012 study update from Child Care Aware
of America on child care costs by state showed that families at the
poverty level paid from a range of 28.9% (Alabama) to 108.9%
141. See I.R.C. § 21(e)(2) (2006). But see id. § 21(e)(4) (2006) (allowing a married person
who files a separate return to not be considered married if the couple lived apart for six
months before the close of the year and the person claiming the exception provides more
than half of the income for the household that year).
142. Id. § 152(a) (2006); id. § 152(c) (2006 & Supp. TV 2010) (defining a qualified child
as including a sister, brother, grandchild, and others of close relationship to the taxpayer).
143. See id. §§ 21(a), (b), (e)(1) (2006).
144. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CAT. No. 15004M, PUB.
503, CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE EXPENSES 11 (2011). The maximum benefit of 35% only
applies to those individuals who make $15,000 or less. Id. The benefit is reduced by 1% or
2% for every $2000 of additional income above $15,000 to a minimum benefit of 20%
reached at $43,000 of income. Id.
145. I.R.C. § 21(c) (2006).
146. See id. § 21 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (located in 26 U.S.C. subtitle A, ch. 1, subch.
A, pt. IV, sub pt. A (listing nonrefundable personal tax credits)). "Refundable" means that
a taxpayer may obtain a negative tax rate, i.e., that she can get more back from a refund
than her total tax liability. BITTER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, 37.1.4.
147. GIANNARELLI & BARSIMANTOV, supra note 97, at 17.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 17-18.
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(D.C.) of their income toward infant care and from 21.1% (Missis-
sippi) to 83.3% (D.C.) toward four-year-old-child care."'
Former section 221 also somewhat alleviated this problem.' 1
The deduction was for 10% of earned income from the lower-
earning spouse, but limited to a maximum deduction of $3000.112
For example, a couple in the 15% tax bracket could save up to
$450 in taxes per year due to this deduction.' People in higher
tax brackets could benefit even more from this deduction. For ex-
ample, a person in a 20% tax bracket could have their tax liability
reduced by up to $600. 1" A combination of something like defunct
section 221 and a refundable Child and Dependent Care Credit
would better allow low-income couples to both be gainfully em-
ployed.
The EITC may provide tax-disincentives for low-income couples
to both be employed."5 For example, in 2011, a married couple
with one child received 34% of the first $9100 as a tax credit, for a
maximum credit of $3094."5 The EITC then began to phase out at
$21,770 (with a phase-out percentage of 15.98%) and was elimi-
nated completely at $41,132.117 Thus, if a low-income single-
earner married couple made $21,000, there was a tax disincentive
for the lower paid partner to work because the credit began to
phase out.
2. Proposal: Secondary Earner Schedule
A lower tax rate for low- to moderate-income levels would pro-
vide incentives for a lower-earning partner to be employed. Such
incentives for two-earner couples would help mitigate the tax-
150. CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE apps. 8-
9, at 50-53 (2012), available at http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default site-pages/20121cosL
report2012mfnal_081012_O.pdLf.
151. See Zelenak, supra note 6, at 374 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF
1981, at 33-34 (1981)).
152. Id.
153. See id. (15% of maximum deduction of $3000).
154. See id. (20% of maximum deduction of $3000).
155. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, 37.1.1. The EITC is a refundable credit,
meaning that a person may have a negative tax rate, i.e., that some people will obtain a
larger return than they pay in taxes. See id.
156. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION 5 (5th ed. Supp. 2012).
157. See id.
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disincentives created by the EITC for low-income couples. At the
same time, the EITC still is available to those couples where it is
not possible, financially or otherwise, for both partners to work.
The benefits of this provision must be balanced against subsidiz-
ing a taxpayer's employment costs. The main goal of this benefit
would be to encourage those who would not work because their
after-tax income is less than the cost of child care and other em-
ployment-related costs. As the following discussion shows, the
overall tax benefit is slight, but it would encourage both partners
to be employed in some low-income families.
There would be several rules, explicit and implicit, for a person
to benefit from this second-earner schedule. First, it would apply
only to the lower-earning partner (or, if both partners make the
same amount, either one-but not both-could file as a second
earner). Second, marital status would be irrelevant for qualifica-
tion; however, there would need to be two earners and a depend-
ent living within the same household. Overall costs increase for a
family with dependents, even if the family has free care provid-
ers. Families today include a same-sex couple with dependents, a
grandparent-parent family, or even two single adult siblings tak-
ing care of a disabled parent. Each are equally deserving of any
family tax benefit. The dependents may be supported by the pri-
mary earner, the secondary earner, or both. These first two re-
quirements would be tracked by requiring the couples to file to-
gether, with the secondary earner filing a schedule attached to
the primary earner's forms, and the primary earner's Form 1040
listing the dependents with their Social Security numbers.'
Implicitly, only those families with taxable income would be
able to take advantage of this provision. If a couple does not have
taxable income, their tax rate is zero, so a reduced tax rate does
not benefit them at all. If a couple's income is this low, they likely
could not afford for both individuals to be employed even with
this benefit. As previously mentioned, couples in this situation
likely can qualify for the EITC.
Since the primary benefit would be to induce lower-earning in-
dividuals with children to find employment, it does not seem
harsh to limit the benefit of the secondary earner schedule to
158. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OMB No. 1545-0074,
FORM 1040: U.S. INDIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (2011).
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those secondary earners who earn less than $34,500 of taxable in-
come. Since the secondary earner must make less than or equal to
the primary earner, a secondary earner who makes $34,500 of
taxable income has at least a combined taxable income with his
or her partner of $69,000. As previously mentioned, families at
this income level are not only able to pay for their necessities but
also can accumulate savings.
15 9
Next it is necessary to determine exactly what rates would ap-
ply to the secondary earner. If the secondary earner was taxed at
a rate 5% below that of an individual with up to $34,500 of in-
come, the secondary earner would have a maximum tax benefit of
$1725. '60 The following is my proposed rate schedule for a second-
ary earner:
§ 1(c): Individuals Filing a Secondary Earner Schedule. 1
There is imposed on the taxable income of-
(1) A qualifying secondary earner (as defined in section _), or
(2) A person qualifying as head of household (as defined in sec-
tion 2(b)), a tax determined according to the following table:
Table 5
If taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $8500 5% of taxable income
Over $8500 but not over $34,500 $425 plus 10% of the excess over $8500
Allowing people who qualify as head of household6 2 to be taxed
at the secondary earner rate, at least if they make less than
$34,500, also is equitable. A head of household is generally a per-
159. See supra Section III.B.
160. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 298.
161. This is a fictional rate schedule created purely to emphasize the utility of a second
rate schedule. I chose section 1(c) because married filing jointly no longer would be a part
of the code under an individual filing system, nor for that matter would married filing
separately. Individual filing likely would be moved to section 1(a) since it would become
the predominant method of calculating tax. Finally, the income brackets follow those un-
der the current individual filing schedule in I.R.C. section 1(c). See Rev. Proc. 2011-12,
2011-2 I.R.C. 298.
162. I.R.C. § 2(b) (2006).
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son who supports dependents and does not live with a spouse.
Today there are many single-parent households and they also do
not benefit from imputed income. '64 If the taxpayer made more
than $34,500, they again would be subject to current head of
household rates. For example, a head of household making
more than $34,500 would be taxed at the 15% rate for the excess
income over $34,500 until the top of that bracket is reached at
$46,250.166
Imagine a situation where the secondary earner had wages of
$30,000.167 His tax liability would be $2575.' A one-person
household or a single-earner couple with $30,000 of income would
have a tax liability of $4075, a difference of $1500.169 At first
glance, the fact that a secondary earner making as much as a
primary earner while paying $1500 less in taxes may seem harsh.
However, a primary earner is either in a one-person household or
has a partner who stays at home. The $1500 difference, therefore,
can be seen as either reflecting a greater ability to pay (the one-
person household) or, in the case of a single-earner couple, a tax
on the imputed income of the stay-at-home partner.""
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this millennium, social attitudes and be-
haviors are much different than they were in 1948. In fact, the
married couple unit is "vanishing"'' and the cohabitating couple
163. "See id.
164. Nancy Shurtz, Sweden, Singapore, and the States: A Comparative Analysis of the
Impact of Taxation on the Welfare of Working Mothers, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1087, 1131
(2011).
165. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.C. 298.
166. Id.
167. Necessarily, the secondary-earner rates only would apply to wages, since income
from property would be taxed at the rates of the primary earner under the general rules of
the proposed individual filing system. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (($30,000 - $8500) x 0.10 + $425 =
$2575).
169. See Rev. Proc. 2011 12, 2011-2 i.R.C. 298.
170. Again, if we assume that the imputed value of household work is at least mini-
mum wage ($7.25 per hour) and a mere forty-hour work week (a stay-at-home parent like-
ly works more than forty hours per week), the imputed value of the homemakers income
would be at least $15,080 subject to a 10% rate; thus, the income would generate a tax lia-
bility of $1,508.
171. Puckett, supra note 116, at 1431.
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is growing rapidly.1 72 The joint return system no longer reflects
the current composition of American families nor their economic
circumstances. Prevailing social attitudes today show that people
feel that a mother can work and be close to her children and that
a father should prioritize extra time with family over extra time
at work.'73 Aside from the erosion of the married couple, many
other factors diminish any rationale for a married couple to de-
rive a benefit from, or be penalized for, being married.
An individual filing system would eliminate marriage bonuses
and penalties because such a system would be marriage-neutral.
Furthermore, such a system would be more equitable because, as
compared with a single-earner married couple, a two-earner mar-
ried couple has more work-related costs and will suffer a "mar-
riage penalty" when their incomes are approximately the same.
Eliminating the anachronistic joint return and its accompanying
marriage bonuses and penalties would reduce tax-based work dis-
incentives for a lower-earning spouse in a married couple. The is-
sue of income attribution can be mitigated by taxing a lower-
earning partner's income from property at the higher-earning
partner's tax rate.
The inequity imposed on low-income families by a return to the
individual filing system can be alleviated by the incorporation of
a secondary earner schedule. This schedule would help only those
families who earn income and pay taxes, but the EITC still would
be available to those who qualify. A broad range of families could
qualify for this tax benefit so long as they had dependents. Child
care costs are burdensome for low-income families and, even
without child care costs, overall costs for a family are increased
with children. The secondary earner schedule, if adopted, would
better reflect today's families than the "married filing jointly" fil-
ing status we have today.
172. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS 3 tbl. 2 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbrlo-03.pdf; TABLE HH-1, supra note 79.
173. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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